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Modern public key protocols, such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), will be 
rendered insecure by Shor’s algorithm [1] when large-scale quantum computers are built. 
Therefore, cryptographers are working on quantum-resistant algorithms, and lattice-based 
cryptography has emerged as a prime candidate [1]. However, high computational complexity 
of these algorithms makes it challenging to implement lattice-based protocols on resource-
constrained IoT devices which need to secure data against both present and future adversaries. 
To address this challenge, we present a lattice cryptography processor with configurable 
parameters which enables up to two orders of magnitude energy savings and 124k-gate 
reduction in system area through architectural optimizations. This is also the first ASIC 
implementation which demonstrates multiple lattice-based protocols proposed in Round 1 of 
the NIST post-quantum standardization process. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Quantum-resistant security for IoT networks – lattice-based cryptography, 
challenges and proposed hardware solutions. 
 
Fig. 1 provides an overview of the “Learning with Errors” (LWE) problem which forms the 
basis of several lattice-based schemes. The LWE hardness assumption states that it is 
computationally difficult to determine the secret vector s, given the matrix A and the vector b 
= As + e, where all arithmetic is modulo a small integer q, and s and e are short vectors sampled 
from a discrete distribution. This hardness is preserved even in the presence of quantum 
adversaries. The two most commonly used variants of LWE are Ring-LWE and Module-LWE, 
which operate on polynomials instead of vectors for efficiency, both of which can be 
accelerated using our processor. 
 
 
Fig. 2: System diagram along with overview of a typical Ring-LWE computation. 
 
Fig. 2 shows the system block diagram, along with details of a typical Ring-LWE computation. 
A 24KB LWE Cache interfaces with a modular arithmetic unit to perform polynomial 
operations including the number theoretic transform (NTT). An energy-efficient Keccak-
f[1600] core, used for hashing and pseudo-random number generation (PRNG), drives the 
discrete distribution sampler. The LWE cache, the Keccak core and the sampler have dedicated 
clock gates which can be independently configured for fine-grained power savings. The 
processor is equipped with a 1KB instruction memory which can be programmed with custom 
instructions to implement various lattice-based algorithms. Two most important computations 
required in all protocols are sampling and convolution. The polynomials are generated, or 
“sampled”, either uniformly through rejection sampling or from a discrete distribution, 
typically binomial, with a carefully chosen standard deviation. Computing convolution of two 
polynomials involves transforming to the NTT domain followed by coefficient-wise 
multiplication and an inverse transform. 
 
 
Fig. 3: Architecture of discrete distribution sampler with efficient PRNG and sampling. 
 
 
The hardness of the LWE problem is directly related to the statistical properties of the sampled 
polynomials. This makes an accurate and efficient sampler a critical component of any lattice 
crypto implementation. Sampling accounts for about 70% of the computational overhead in 
software implementations of lattice-based protocols [2]. Fig. 3 describes an energy-efficient 
discrete distribution sampler which reduces this overhead and provides up to two orders of 
magnitude energy savings over assembly-optimized software. Samplers post-process pseudo-
random bit strings to generate numbers from a specified distribution, thus making an efficient 
PRNG a key requirement for energy savings. Hardware implementations of three standard 
PRNGs with full data-path architectures were profiled on our test chip, and SHA-3 (SHAKE) 
was observed to be 2x and 3x more energy-efficient than ChaCha20 and AES respectively. 
Therefore, our PRNG consists of a 24-cycle 34k-gate Keccak-f[1600] core which can be 
configured in different SHA-3 modes and consumes 0.89 nJ per round. Our Keccak core 
processes its 1600-bit state in parallel, thus avoiding expensive register shifts and multiplexing 
required in serial architectures. The associated area overhead is very small, since the PRNG 
accounts for only 9% of the total processor area. Rejection sampling for primes with high 
rejection probability can be a bottleneck in LWE-based protocols. For faster rejection 
sampling, the rejection bound is set as a multiple of the prime modulus q [3] followed by Barrett 
reduction, providing up to 43% energy savings compared to conventional rejection. Our 
binomial sampler takes two k-bit chunks (k ≤ 32, configurable) from the PRNG and computes 
the difference of their Hamming weights (HW) to generate a sample with standard deviation σ 
= √(k/2). This method is 16x more energy-efficient than the conventional Knuth-Yao (KY) 
sampler [1, 4], and is also constant-time, thus eliminating potential timing side-channels. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Proposed single-port RAM-based area-efficient NTT architecture 
with processor area breakdown and NTT energy profiling. 
 
Polynomial operations, such as NTT and convolution, account for about 30% of the 
computations. However, the associated memory and logic together occupy more than 75% of 
the total hardware area. Hardware architectures for NTT, first proposed in [1], consist of SRAM 
banks for storing polynomials along with a modular arithmetic unit to perform the butterfly 
computations. These memories are typically implemented using two-port [1] or four-port [4] 
RAMs, which can pose large area overheads in resource-constrained devices. To reduce this 
area, we implement the constant geometry NTT [5] and split each polynomial among 4 single-
port RAMs, as shown in Fig. 4. Regular memory access patterns of the constant geometry NTT 
allow butterfly inputs and outputs to ping-pong between these single-port RAMs without any 
read or write hazards. This NTT architecture provides ~124k-gate area savings compared to 
the traditional approach, while still having enough memory to accommodate multiple 
polynomials required in lattice-based algorithms. The constant factors ω and ψ used in NTT-
based negative-wrapped convolution are related as ω = ψ2 and ω-i = ωN-i, which is used to 
compress pre-computed tables stored in the NTT Constants RAM by 38%. The butterfly, with 
a 24-bit data-path and configurable modulus q, is implemented as a unified Cooley-Tukey (CT) 
+ Gentleman-Sande (GS) structure, which eliminates the need for expensive bit reversals. The 
multiplier and adder/subtractor in the butterfly are re-used for coefficient-wise modular 
operations on polynomials. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Configurability of the lattice cryptography processor along with 
NIST Round 1 post-quantum protocol benchmarks. 
 
Fig. 5 demonstrates the configurability of our processor by benchmarking NIST Round 1 post-
quantum protocols such as Kyber [6], NewHope [7], R-EMBLEM [8] and LIMA [9]. Our 
hardware can be configured for polynomials of length (N) 64 to 2048, modulus q up to 24 bits, 
and discrete distributions with varying standard deviations, thus allowing the processor to tune 
the security level to provide energy scalability. When executing the Kyber-768 and NewHope-
1024 key exchange schemes, our design is respectively 28x and 37x more energy-efficient than 
Cortex-M4 software, after accounting for voltage scaling. Moreover, post-quantum key 
exchange using our processor is 30x more energy-efficient than state-of-the-art pre-quantum 
ECC-based key exchange [10] at the same pre-quantum security level. 
 
Fig. 6: Comparison with Cortex-M4 software and hardware lattice cryptography accelerators. 
 
Fig. 6 compares this work with software implementation on ARM Cortex-M4 as well as 
previous work in custom hardware design for lattice-based cryptography. The proposed single-
port RAM-based NTT architecture makes our design more area-efficient than [4]. Although 
the use of multiple parallel butterflies can reduce NTT energy [4], we have used a single 
butterfly since NTT is only a small fraction of the total computation. An energy-efficient SHA-
3 core along with our fast sampling architecture provides 28x energy savings in binomial 
sampling compared to [4]. This work also demonstrates complete lattice-based protocols, while 
achieving more than an order of magnitude improvement in energy-efficiency over software. 
 
 
Fig. 7: Chip micrograph and performance summary. 
 
The chip was fabricated in a 40nm LP CMOS process and supports voltage scaling from 1.1V 
down to 0.68V. All hardware measurements are reported at 12MHz and 0.68V. Our lattice 
cryptography processor occupies 106k NAND Gate Equivalents (GE) and uses 40.25KB of 
SRAM. It has an average power of 516 µW when performing the NewHope post-quantum key 
exchange. Through architectural and algorithmic optimizations, this work demonstrates 
practical hardware-accelerated quantum-resistant lattice-based cryptographic protocols that 
can be used to secure resource-constrained IoT devices of the near future. 
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